Motivated Action Theory: A Formal Theory of Causal Reasoning

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/6587

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Stein, Lynn Andrea	-
dc.creator	Morgenstern, Leora	-
dc.date	2004-10-08T20:29:05Z	-
dc.date	2004-10-08T20:29:05Z	-
dc.date	1991-12-01	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-09T02:46:07Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-09T02:46:07Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-09	-
dc.identifier	AIM-1338	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/6587	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721	-
dc.description	When we reason about change over time, causation provides an implicit preference: we prefer sequences of situations in which one situation leads causally to the next, rather than sequences in which one situation follows another at random and without causal connections. In this paper, we explore the problem of temporal reasoning --- reasoning about change over time --- and the crucial role that causation plays in our intuitions. We examine previous approaches to temporal reasoning, and their shortcomings, in light of this analysis. We propose a new system for causal reasoning, motivated action theory, which builds upon causation as a crucial preference creterion. Motivated action theory solves the traditional problems of both forward and backward reasoning, and additionally provides a basis for a new theory of explanation.	-
dc.format	3623988 bytes	-
dc.format	2840664 bytes	-
dc.format	application/postscript	-
dc.format	application/pdf	-
dc.language	en_US	-
dc.relation	AIM-1338	-
dc.title	Motivated Action Theory: A Formal Theory of Causal Reasoning	-
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