أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Schertler, Andrea
dc.date 2002
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:56:42Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:56:42Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17781
dc.identifier ppn:351270655
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17781
dc.description This paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture capitalist?s incentives to finance start-up enterprises and to support the management teams. In a double-sided moral hazard model, it is shown that experienced venture capitalists, who have already financed start-up enterprises, reduce their intensity of management support under public equity schemes. However, public equity offers inexperienced venture capitalists, who have not yet financed start-up enterprises because of insuf-ficient experience, incentives to enter the venture capital market so that they can start to accumulate experience.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel
dc.relation Kieler Arbeitspapiere 1117
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject L14
dc.subject G28
dc.subject G24
dc.subject D82
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Double-sided moral hazard
dc.subject public equity
dc.subject venture capital
dc.subject Risikokapital
dc.subject Öffentliche Kapitalbeteiligung
dc.subject Subvention
dc.subject Unternehmensgründung
dc.subject Finanzierungstheorie
dc.subject Moral Hazard
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Venture Capitalists Investment Incentives Under Public Equity Schemes
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط