Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model

dc.creator	Borck, Rainald
dc.date	2003
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T06:58:07Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T06:58:07Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071
dc.identifier	ppn:369048423
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18071
dc.description	This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher	Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin
dc.relation	DIW-Diskussionspapiere 335
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	D72
dc.subject	H77
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	tax competition
dc.subject	voting
dc.subject	Steuerwettbewerb
dc.subject	Steuersystem
dc.subject	Public Choice
dc.subject	Abstimmungsregel
dc.subject	Theorie
dc.title	Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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