أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Kyureghian, Hrachya
dc.creator Sarangi, Sudipta
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:58:18Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:58:18Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18102
dc.identifier ppn:38300599X
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18102
dc.description We consider a linear city model where both firms and consumers have to incur transport costs. Following a standard Hotelling (1929) type framework we analyze a duopoly where firms facing a continuum of consumers choose locations and prices, with the transportation rate being linear in distance. From a theoretical point of view such a model is interesting since mill pricing and uniform delivery pricing arise as special cases. Given the complex nature of the profit function for the two-stage transport cost sharing game, we invoke simplifying assumptions and solve for two different games. We provide a complete characterization for the equilibrium of the location game between the duopolists by removing the price choice from the strategy space. We then find that if the two firms are constrained to locate at the same spot, the resulting price competition leads to a mixed strategy equilibrium with discriminatory rationing. In equilibrium both firms always have positive expected profits. Finally, we derive a pure strategy equilibrium for the two-stage game. Results are then compared with the mill pricing and uniform delivery pricing models.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin
dc.relation DIW-Diskussionspapiere 406
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject C72
dc.subject D43
dc.subject L13
dc.subject R1
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Spatial Competition
dc.subject Cost Sharing
dc.subject Hotelling Modell
dc.subject Räumlicher Wettbewerb
dc.subject Transportkosten
dc.subject Nichtkooperatives Spiel
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject cost sharing
dc.title Transport Cost Sharing and Spatial Competition
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط