| dc.creator |
Inderst, Roman |
|
| dc.creator |
Wey, Christian |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T06:58:32Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T06:58:32Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18160 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:390614343 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18160 |
|
| dc.description |
We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders´ share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is more likely under Bertrand competition if goods are substitutes and more likely under Cournot competition if goods are complements. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
|
| dc.relation |
DIW-Diskussionspapiere 423 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
L13 |
|
| dc.subject |
D43 |
|
| dc.subject |
L41 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Takeover bidding |
|
| dc.subject |
Merger incentives |
|
| dc.subject |
Oligopoly |
|
| dc.subject |
Übernahme |
|
| dc.subject |
Fusion |
|
| dc.subject |
Oligopol |
|
| dc.subject |
Duopol |
|
| dc.subject |
Ökonomischer Anreiz |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|