| dc.creator |
Schröder, Philipp J. H. |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T06:58:34Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T06:58:34Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18168 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:390960861 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18168 |
|
| dc.description |
This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other?s markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, thus integration is pro-competitive. If integration consists of a reductions in unit (fixed) trade costs a price setting cartel is strengthened (unaffected), while a quantity setting one is weakened. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
|
| dc.relation |
DIW-Diskussionspapiere 432 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
F15 |
|
| dc.subject |
F12 |
|
| dc.subject |
L12 |
|
| dc.subject |
L13 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Collusive behavior |
|
| dc.subject |
trade liberalisation |
|
| dc.subject |
specific tariffs |
|
| dc.subject |
market access cost |
|
| dc.subject |
Kartell |
|
| dc.subject |
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung |
|
| dc.subject |
Aussenhandelsliberalisierung |
|
| dc.subject |
Wirtschaftsintegration |
|
| dc.subject |
Zolltheorie |
|
| dc.subject |
Kosten |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Cartel Stability and Economic Integration |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|