أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Kannan, Rajgopal
dc.creator Sarangi, Sudipta
dc.creator Iyengar, Sundaraja Sitharama
dc.date 2002
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:59:17Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:59:17Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18282
dc.identifier ppn:361580320
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18282
dc.description We consider a model of an information network where nodes can fail and transmission of information is costly. The formation of paths in such networks is modeled as the Nash equilibrium of an N player routing game. The task of obtaining this equilibrium is shown to be NP-Hard. We derive analytical results to identify conditions under which the equilibrium path is congruent to well known paths such as the most reliable or cheapest neighbor path. The issue of characterizing off-equilibrium paths in the game is addressed and different path utility metrics proposed. Our first metric measures the degree of individual node suboptimality by evaluating paths in terms of the weakness of the worst-off player. It is shown that there exist information networks not containing paths of weakness less than Vr/3. Consequently, guaranteeing approximate equilibrium paths of bounded weakness is computationally difficult. We next propose a team game with players having a common payoff function whose equilibrium outcome can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, a fair team game with bounded payoff difference is proposed whose equilibrium is also easily computable.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin
dc.relation DIW-Diskussionspapiere 298
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject C72
dc.subject D83
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Nash Networks
dc.subject Equilibrium Complexity
dc.subject Team Games
dc.subject Informationsverhalten
dc.subject Netzwerk
dc.subject Spieltheorie
dc.subject Nash-Gleichgewicht
dc.subject Netzplantechnik
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Strategic path reliability in information networks
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط