المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Corporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of Network Access: A Model of the German Gas Sector

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dc.creator Meran, Georg
dc.creator von Hirschhausen, Christian R.
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:59:19Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:59:19Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18289
dc.identifier ppn:394290127
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18289
dc.description This paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monopsonistic gas customer fix quantities and the network access price, whereas the competitive fringe of foreign gas producers (third party) and the household customers are excluded from the agreement. The results are then compared with the outcome of traditional ex-ante regulation. We find that while industrial self-regulation leads to an exploitation of households, the effect on the foreign producers is unclear.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin
dc.relation DIW-Diskussionspapiere 436
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject L95
dc.subject D43
dc.subject L13
dc.subject L51
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.title Corporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of Network Access: A Model of the German Gas Sector
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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