المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Fiscal Competition, Capital-Skill Complementarity, and the Composition of Public Spending

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dc.creator Borck, Rainald
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:59:36Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:59:36Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18355
dc.identifier ppn:494463309
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18355
dc.description Following Keen and Marchand (1997), the paper analyses the effect of fiscal competition on the composition of public spending in a model where capital and skilled workers are mobile while low skilled workers are immobile. Taxes are levied on capital and labour. Each group of workers benefits from a different kind of public good. Mobility of skilled workers provides an incentive for jurisdictions to spend ?too much? on public goods benefitting the skilled and ?too little? on those benefitting low skilled workers. In the case of capital-skill complementarity, this incentive is strengthened. The analysis is then extended to allow for mobility of unskilled labour.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin
dc.relation DIW-Diskussionspapiere 504
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J24
dc.subject H77
dc.subject J61
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Tax competition
dc.subject capital skill complementarity
dc.subject public spending
dc.subject New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
dc.subject Betriebliche Preispolitik
dc.subject Preisstatistik
dc.subject Schätzung
dc.subject Welt
dc.title Fiscal Competition, Capital-Skill Complementarity, and the Composition of Public Spending
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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