أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Dröge, Susanne
dc.creator Schröder, Philipp J. H.
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:59:42Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:59:42Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18385
dc.identifier ppn:505101815
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18385
dc.description The ad valorem versus unit taxes debate has traditionally emphasized tax yield. For this criterion, ad valorem taxes outperform unit taxes in terms of welfare for a wide range of imperfect competition settings, including Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition. Yet, in a number of policy fields, such as environmental, health or trade economics, policy makers apply taxes to target the production/consumption volume in an industry, i.e. aim at a certain corrective effect rather than tax yield. This paper compares the two tax instruments with respect to equal corrective-effect in a Dixit-Stiglitz setting with love of variety, entry, exit, and redistribution of tax revenues. We find that unit taxes lead to more firms in the industry, less output per firm, less tax revenue, but higher welfare compared to ad valorem taxes.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin
dc.relation DIW-Diskussionspapiere 534
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H23
dc.subject L13
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Externalities
dc.subject Monopolistic competition
dc.subject Taxes
dc.subject Specific Taxes
dc.subject Welfare
dc.title Corrective Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes: A Welfare Comparison
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط