dc.creator |
Gautier, Pieter A. |
|
dc.creator |
Moraga-González, José Luis |
|
dc.date |
2004 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:00:48Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:00:48Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18669 |
|
dc.identifier |
ppn:477262031 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18669 |
|
dc.description |
We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workers apply for two or for more (but not for all) jobs always exhibits wage dispersion and, typically, unemployment; (iii) the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-tounemployment ratio first-order stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower level of labor market tightness; (iv) the average wage is non-monotonic in the number of applications; (v) the equilibrium number of applications is non-monotonic in the vacancy-tounemployment ratio; (vi) a minimum wage increase can be welfare improving because it compresses the wage distribution and reduces the congestion effects caused by the socially excessive number of applications; and (vii) the only way to obtain efficiency is to impose a mandatory wage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether. |
|
dc.language |
eng |
|
dc.publisher |
|
|
dc.relation |
CESifo working papers 1304 |
|
dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
dc.subject |
J41 |
|
dc.subject |
D83 |
|
dc.subject |
D62 |
|
dc.subject |
J23 |
|
dc.subject |
J64 |
|
dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
dc.subject |
wage setting |
|
dc.subject |
unemployment |
|
dc.subject |
minimum wage |
|
dc.subject |
Nash equilibrium |
|
dc.subject |
Lohnbildung |
|
dc.subject |
Lohnverhandlungen |
|
dc.subject |
Nash-Gleichgewicht |
|
dc.subject |
Lohnverhandlungstheorie |
|
dc.subject |
Arbeitsuche |
|
dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
dc.title |
Strategic wage setting and coordination frictions with multiple applications |
|
dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|