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Strategic wage setting and coordination frictions with multiple applications

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dc.creator Gautier, Pieter A.
dc.creator Moraga-González, José Luis
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:00:48Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:00:48Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18669
dc.identifier ppn:477262031
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18669
dc.description We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workers apply for two or for more (but not for all) jobs always exhibits wage dispersion and, typically, unemployment; (iii) the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-tounemployment ratio first-order stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower level of labor market tightness; (iv) the average wage is non-monotonic in the number of applications; (v) the equilibrium number of applications is non-monotonic in the vacancy-tounemployment ratio; (vi) a minimum wage increase can be welfare improving because it compresses the wage distribution and reduces the congestion effects caused by the socially excessive number of applications; and (vii) the only way to obtain efficiency is to impose a mandatory wage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1304
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J41
dc.subject D83
dc.subject D62
dc.subject J23
dc.subject J64
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject wage setting
dc.subject unemployment
dc.subject minimum wage
dc.subject Nash equilibrium
dc.subject Lohnbildung
dc.subject Lohnverhandlungen
dc.subject Nash-Gleichgewicht
dc.subject Lohnverhandlungstheorie
dc.subject Arbeitsuche
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Strategic wage setting and coordination frictions with multiple applications
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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