أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Riedel, Frank
dc.creator Wolfstetter, Elmar
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:00:50Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:00:50Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18680
dc.identifier ppn:477398634
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18680
dc.description The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1315
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D45
dc.subject D44
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Simultaneous Ascending Auction
dc.subject weak dominance
dc.subject multi-unit auctions
dc.subject game theory
dc.subject Auktionstheorie
dc.subject Vollkommene Information
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط