أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Napel, Stefan
dc.creator Widgrén, Mika
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:00:57Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:00:57Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18710
dc.identifier ppn:477414281
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18710
dc.description This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act strategically. Predicted bargaining outcomes of the crucial Conciliation stage of codecision are shown to be strongly biased towards the legislative status quo. Making symmetric preference assumptions for members of CM and EP, CM is on average much more conservative because of its internal qualified majority rule. This makes CM by an order of magnitude more influential than EP, in contrast to a seeming formal parity between the two ?co-legislators?.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1347
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D72
dc.subject C70
dc.subject D70
dc.subject C78
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject power measurement
dc.subject European Union codecision procedure
dc.subject bargaining
dc.subject spatial voting
dc.subject decision procedures
dc.subject EU-Politik
dc.subject Politische Entscheidung
dc.subject Verhandlungsmacht
dc.subject Public Choice
dc.subject Verhandlungstheorie
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject EU-Staaten
dc.title The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط