المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Fiscal and monetary interaction : the role of asymmetries of the stability and growth pact in EMU

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dc.creator Governatori, Matteo
dc.creator Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W.
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:00:59Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:00:59Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18717
dc.identifier ppn:477478794
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18717
dc.description The paper builds a simplified model describing the economy of a currency union with decentralised national fiscal policy, where the main features characterising the policy-making are similar to those in EMU. National governments choose the size of deficit taking into account the two main rules of the Stability and Growth Pact on public finance. Unlike previous literature the asymmetric working of those rules is explicitly modelled in order to identify its impact on the Nash equilibrium of deficits arising from a game of strategic interaction between fiscal authorities in the union.
dc.language eng
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1354
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H7
dc.subject H3
dc.subject E61
dc.subject H6
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Stability and Growth Pact
dc.subject EMU
dc.subject asymmetric fiscal rules
dc.subject decentralised fiscal policy
dc.subject Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion
dc.subject EU-Stabilitätspakt
dc.subject Finanzpolitik
dc.subject Internationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordination
dc.subject EU-Staaten
dc.title Fiscal and monetary interaction : the role of asymmetries of the stability and growth pact in EMU
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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