المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Macroeconomic stabilization policies in the EMU : spillovers, asymmetries, and institutions

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dc.creator Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni
dc.creator Engwerda, Jacob
dc.creator Plasmans, Joseph
dc.creator van Aarle, Bas
dc.creator Michalak, Tomasz
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:04Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:04Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18740
dc.identifier ppn:479115796
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18740
dc.description This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the EMU context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When asymmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination doesn?t produce further gains in policymakers? welfare.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1376
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject E63
dc.subject E61
dc.subject E58
dc.subject E17
dc.subject C70
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject macroeconomic stabilization
dc.subject EMU
dc.subject coalition formation
dc.subject linear quadratic differential games
dc.subject Konjunkturpolitik
dc.subject Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion
dc.subject Internationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordination
dc.subject Geldpolitik
dc.subject Finanzpolitik
dc.subject Koalition
dc.subject Nichtkooperatives Spiel
dc.subject Asymmetrische Information
dc.subject Schock
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Macroeconomic stabilization policies in the EMU : spillovers, asymmetries, and institutions
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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