أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Corneo, Giacomo
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:14Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:14Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18766
dc.identifier ppn:479303509
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18766
dc.description Since objective news coverage is vital to democracy, captured media can seriously distort collective decisions. The current paper develops a voting model where citizens are uncertain about the welfare effects induced by alternative policy options and derive information about those effects from the mass media. The media might however secretly collude with interest groups in order to influence the public opinion. In the case of voting over the level of a productivity-enhancing public bad, it is shown that an increase in the concentration of firm ownership makes the occurrence of media bias more likely. Although media bias is not always welfare worsening, conditions for it to raise welfare are restrictive.
dc.language eng
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1402
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D72
dc.subject H41
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject mass media
dc.subject public bads
dc.subject voting
dc.subject wealth inequality
dc.subject Kommunikationsmedien
dc.subject Informationsverhalten
dc.subject Demokratie
dc.subject Wirtschaftskonzentration
dc.subject Wirtschaftliche Macht
dc.subject Interessenpolitik
dc.subject Public Choice
dc.subject Wohlfahrtseffekt
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Media capture in a democracy : the role of wealth concentration
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط