المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Legislative malapportionment and the politicization of Germany's intergovernmental transfer system

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dc.creator Pitlik, Hans
dc.creator Schneider, Friedrich G.
dc.creator Strotmann, Harald
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:21Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:21Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18790
dc.identifier ppn:484747568
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18790
dc.description Legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits to overrepresented states. The present paper analyses empirically the distribution of fiscal transfers in Germany's intergovernmental transfer system over the period 1970-2002. It can be shown that overrepresented states in the upper house receive disproportionate shares of transfers, while malapportionment in the lower house does not seem to matter. We also find empirical evidence that overrepresentation became more important over time.
dc.language eng
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1426
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D7
dc.subject H77
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject legislative bargaining
dc.subject overrepresentation
dc.subject fiscal transfer system
dc.subject Germany
dc.subject Finanzausgleich
dc.subject Föderalismus
dc.subject Verhandlungstheorie
dc.subject Verhandlungsmacht
dc.subject Deutschland
dc.title Legislative malapportionment and the politicization of Germany's intergovernmental transfer system
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper
dc.coverage 1972-2000


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