المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Optimal redistributive taxation when government's and agents' preferences differ

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dc.creator Blomquist, Sören
dc.creator Micheletto, Luca
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:21Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:21Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18793
dc.identifier ppn:48493256X
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18793
dc.description Paternalism, merit goods and specific egalitarianism are concepts we sometimes meet in the literature. The thing in common is that the policy maker does not fully respect the consumer sovereignty principle and designs policies according to some other criterion than individuals? preferences. Using the self-selection approach to tax problems developed by Stiglitz (1982) and Stern (1982), the paper provides a characterization of the properties of an optimal redistributive mixed tax scheme in the general case when the government evaluates individuals? well-being using a different utility function than the one maximized by private agents.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1429
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H21
dc.subject H23
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject optimal taxation
dc.subject behavioral economics
dc.subject paternalism
dc.subject merit goods
dc.subject non-welfarism
dc.subject Optimale Besteuerung
dc.subject Einkommensumverteilung
dc.subject Steuersystem
dc.subject Meritorisches Gut
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Optimal redistributive taxation when government's and agents' preferences differ
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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