Intra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfers

dc.creator	Kolmar, Martin
dc.creator	Meier, Volker
dc.date	2005
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:01:23Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:01:23Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18801
dc.identifier	ppn:485158213
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18801
dc.description	In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in every generation if the growth rate of the economy is positive. This result yields an alternative explanation for the existence of pay-as-you-go financed transfer mechanisms.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1437
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	H55
dc.subject	H23
dc.subject	D82
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	pay-as-you-go
dc.subject	externalities
dc.subject	mechanism design
dc.subject	adverse selection
dc.subject	Umlageverfahren
dc.subject	Privater Transfer
dc.subject	Externer Effekt
dc.subject	Generationenbeziehungen
dc.subject	Adverse Selection
dc.subject	Asymmetrische Information
dc.subject	Pareto-Optimum
dc.subject	Theorie
dc.title	Intra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfers
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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