أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Jansen, Jos
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:30Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:30Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18823
dc.identifier ppn:485193493
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18823
dc.description A firm actively manages its rival?s beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on the size of its process innovation. The firm?s disclosure strategy results from the trade-off between two effects on product market incentives. First, the firm?s competitor learns that the firm is efficient, which discourages the competitor. Second, the competitor becomes more efficient himself, since he can expropriate part of the disclosed knowledge, which encourages him. I characterize the equilibrium disclosure strategies for any knowledge spillover in a simple Cournot duopoly model, and illustrate the results graphically. Moreover, I compare the strategic disclosure equilibria with equilibria under non-strategic disclosure.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1459
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject L23
dc.subject D82
dc.subject O31
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject process innovation
dc.subject Cournot competition
dc.subject strategic substitutes
dc.subject information disclosure
dc.subject knowledge spillovers
dc.subject Innovationswettbewerb
dc.subject Duopol
dc.subject Informationsverhalten
dc.subject Forschungskosten
dc.subject Publizitätspflicht
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title The effects of disclosure regulation of an innovative firm
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط