أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Fehr, Ernst
dc.creator Kremhelmer, Susanne
dc.creator Schmidt, Klaus M.
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:32Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:32Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18831
dc.identifier ppn:488926130
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18831
dc.description We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1467
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J3
dc.subject C9
dc.subject C7
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject ownership rights
dc.subject double moral hazard
dc.subject fairness
dc.subject reciprocity
dc.subject incomplete contracts
dc.subject Eigentumsrechtstheorie
dc.subject Allokation
dc.subject Joint Venture
dc.subject Experiment
dc.subject Moral Hazard
dc.subject Gerechtigkeit
dc.subject reciprocity
dc.title Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط