أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Vogelsang, Ingo
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:32Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:32Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18838
dc.identifier ppn:488945666
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18838
dc.description Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a ?used and useful? criterion.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1474
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject L5
dc.subject L9
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Stromtarif
dc.subject Stromnetz
dc.subject Netzzugang
dc.subject Unternehmensregulierung
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Electricity transmission pricing and performance-based regulation
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط