أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Fehr, Ernst
dc.creator Klein, Alexander
dc.creator Schmidt, Klaus M.
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:39Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:39Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18854
dc.identifier ppn:392916681
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18854
dc.description We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become inferior when some agents value fairness. Conversely, implicit bonus contracts that are doomed to fail among purely selfish actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are some fair-minded players. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts, even preferring a pure bonus contract over a contract that combines the enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit incentives weaken the enforcement power of implicit bonus incentives significantly. Our results are largely consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which also offer interesting new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1215
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J3
dc.subject C7
dc.subject C9
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject moral hazard
dc.subject incentives
dc.subject bonus contract
dc.subject fairness
dc.subject inequity aversion
dc.subject Anreizvertrag
dc.subject Gerechtigkeit
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Contracts, fairness, and incentives
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط