DSpace Repository

Tax competition under minimum rates : the case of European diesel excises

Show simple item record

dc.creator Evers, Michiel
dc.creator De Mooij, Ruud A.
dc.creator Vollebergh, Herman R. J.
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:42Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:42Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18860
dc.identifier ppn:390922080
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18860
dc.description This paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors? tax rates. This provides evidence for the presence of tax competition in diesel excises. In fact, a 10 percent higher rate in neighboring countries (in terms of the user price) induces a country to raise its own rate by between 2 and 3 percent. This impact is robust for alternative specifications. By imposing restrictions on excise levels, EU harmonization of excises in 1987 and the introduction of a minimum in 1992 exerted a positive impact on the excise level in a number of EU countries. It has not, however, significantly reduced the intensity of tax competition. Indeed, strategic tax responses have not significantly been reduced by these harmonization policies. We also find that high-tax countries appear to compete more aggressively than low-tax countries in the sense that they feature larger strategic tax responses. There is no significant difference between large and small countries.
dc.language eng
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1221
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H87
dc.subject R4
dc.subject H77
dc.subject H23
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Diesel excise
dc.subject strategic tax setting
dc.subject minimum rates
dc.subject European Union
dc.subject Dieselkraftstoff
dc.subject Mineralölsteuer
dc.subject Steuerwettbewerb
dc.subject EU-Steuerrecht
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject EU-Staaten
dc.title Tax competition under minimum rates : the case of European diesel excises
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account