المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Inflation targeting and nonlinear policy rules : the case of asymmetric preferences

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dc.creator Surico, Paolo
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:01:55Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:01:55Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18918
dc.identifier ppn:470778776
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18918
dc.description This paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policy analysis in which the decision-makers are allowed to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output from the target values. Reduced-form and structural estimates of the central bank first order condition indicate that the preferences of the Fed have been highly asymmetric only before 1979, with the response to output contractions being larger than the response to output expansions of the same magnitude. This asymmetry is shown to induce an average inflation bias of 1.11% that appears to have substantially contributed to the great inflation of the 1960s and 1970s.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1280
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject E58
dc.subject E52
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject asymmetric objective
dc.subject nonlinear monetary policy rules
dc.subject average inflation bias
dc.subject Geldpolitisches Ziel
dc.subject Inflation Targeting
dc.subject Regelgebundene Politik
dc.subject Schätzung
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject Vereinigte Staaten
dc.title Inflation targeting and nonlinear policy rules : the case of asymmetric preferences
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper
dc.coverage 1960-2003


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