Tax morale and optimal taxation

dc.creator	Gueth, Werner
dc.creator	Sausgruber, Rupert
dc.date	2004
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:01:57Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:01:57Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18922
dc.identifier	ppn:47119123X
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18922
dc.description	We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between two tax regimes to fund a public good. The first-best tax regime imposes a general, distortion-free income tax. However, this tax cannot be enforced. The second-best alternative supplements the income tax by a specific commodity tax. This tax cannot be evaded but distorts optimal consumption choices, instead. The result is that a large majority of subjects prefer the general income tax regime. The bulk of votes is consistent with actual payoffs. We isolate tax morale as cause for payoffs above theoretical predictions.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1284
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	H26
dc.subject	H21
dc.subject	C91
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	optimal taxation
dc.subject	tax evasion
dc.subject	voting
dc.subject	experiments
dc.subject	Optimale Besteuerung
dc.subject	Steuersystem
dc.subject	Steuermoral
dc.subject	Wahlverhalten
dc.subject	Experiment
dc.title	Tax morale and optimal taxation
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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