| dc.creator |
Amegashie, J. Atsu |
|
| dc.creator |
Runkel, Marco |
|
| dc.date |
2005 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:02:11Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:02:11Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:500517312 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18964 |
|
| dc.description |
This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
CESifo working papers 1500 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
D74 |
|
| dc.subject |
D72 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
all-pay auction |
|
| dc.subject |
elimination contests |
|
| dc.subject |
potential rival |
|
| dc.subject |
sabotage |
|
| dc.subject |
Wirtschaftskriminalität |
|
| dc.subject |
Wettbewerb |
|
| dc.subject |
Auktionstheorie |
|
| dc.subject |
Spieltheorie |
|
| dc.title |
Sabotaging potential rivals |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|