أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Amegashie, J. Atsu
dc.creator Runkel, Marco
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:11Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:11Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964
dc.identifier ppn:500517312
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18964
dc.description This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1500
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D74
dc.subject D72
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject all-pay auction
dc.subject elimination contests
dc.subject potential rival
dc.subject sabotage
dc.subject Wirtschaftskriminalität
dc.subject Wettbewerb
dc.subject Auktionstheorie
dc.subject Spieltheorie
dc.title Sabotaging potential rivals
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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