أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Buchholz, Wolfgang
dc.creator Peters, Wolfgang
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:21Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:21Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19000
dc.identifier ppn:500850879
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19000
dc.description The Lindahl equilibrium is mostly motivated by a rather artificial price mechanism. Even though the analogy to a competitive market has been emphasised by Lindahl himself his approach does not directly explain the normative ideas, which are behind this concept. In the present paper we therefore show how the Lindahl equilibrium can be deduced from some simple equity axioms that in particular are related to the equal sacrifice principle and a nonenvy postulate as norms for distributional equity. Fairness among agents with different preferences is taken into account by considering their marginal willingnesses to pay as virtual prices. In this way it might also become more understandable why the Lindahl solution can be perceived as an outcome of fair cooperation.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1536
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H41
dc.subject D63
dc.subject C78
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject public goods
dc.subject Lindahl equilibrium
dc.subject fairness
dc.subject equity
dc.subject Öffentliches Gut
dc.subject Gleichgewichtstheorie
dc.subject Verteilungsgerechtigkeit
dc.subject Verhandlungstheorie
dc.subject Gerechtigkeit
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Justifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط