أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Brekke, Kurt R.
dc.creator Nuscheler, Robert
dc.creator Straume, Odd Rune
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:24Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:24Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19016
dc.identifier ppn:503669504
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19016
dc.description We study the competitive effects of restricting direct access to secondary care by gatekeeping, focusing on the informational role of general practitioners (GPs). In the secondary care market there are two hospitals choosing quality and specialisation. Patients, who are ex ante uninformed, can consult a GP to receive an (imperfect) diagnosis and obtain information about the secondary care market. We show that hospital competition is amplified by higher GP attendance but dampened by improved diagnosing accuracy. Therefore, compulsory gatekeeping may result in excessive quality competition and too much specialisation, unless the mismatch costs and the diagnosing accuracy are sufficiently high. Second-best price regulation makes direct regulation of GP consultation redundant, but will generally not implement first-best.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1552
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject I18
dc.subject I11
dc.subject D82
dc.subject L13
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject gatekeeping
dc.subject imperfect information
dc.subject quality competition
dc.subject product differentiation
dc.subject price regulation
dc.subject Gesundheitswesen
dc.subject Gesundheitspolitik
dc.subject Ärzte
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject Hausarztsystem
dc.title Gatekeeping in health care
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط