أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط
| dc.creator |
Nielsen, Søren Bo |
|
| dc.creator |
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis |
|
| dc.creator |
Schjelderup, Guttorm |
|
| dc.date |
2005 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:02:36Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:02:36Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19050 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:503740586 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19050 |
|
| dc.description |
The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise?s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument -, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
CESifo working papers 1586 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
F23 |
|
| dc.subject |
H25 |
|
| dc.subject |
L23 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
centralized vs. de-centralized decisions |
|
| dc.subject |
taxes |
|
| dc.subject |
MNEs |
|
| dc.subject |
Multinationales Unternehmen |
|
| dc.subject |
Steuer |
|
| dc.subject |
Organisationsstruktur |
|
| dc.subject |
Transferpreis |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|
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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط