أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Weichenrieder, Alfons J.
dc.creator Busch, Oliver
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:54Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:54Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19101
dc.identifier ppn:510009174
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19101
dc.description A long-standing concern in the literature has been that household mobility implies a serious threat to the viability of redistributive taxation. This paper considers the effects of deferred integration of migrants into the redistributive system of the target country. In a model of symmetric regions, deferred integration introduces a time consistency problem into governments' tax plans which reduces a region's incentive to undercut other regions' tax rates and can bring tax competition to a halt. On the one hand, rich migrants cease to benefit from the lower tax rate in the current period. On the other hand, the region's promise of a continuing low rate in the future is not credible. We also explore the case where poor recipients of social assistance are mobile while the rich are immobile.
dc.language eng
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1637
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H25
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject tax competition
dc.subject federalism
dc.subject mobility
dc.subject social assistance
dc.subject time consistency
dc.subject Steuerwettbewerb
dc.subject Einkommensumverteilung
dc.subject Binnenwanderung
dc.subject Soziale Integration
dc.subject Zeitkonsistenz
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Artificial time inconsistency as a remedy for the race to the bottom
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط