المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Rent-seeking competition from State coffers : a calibrated DSGE model of the Euro area

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dc.creator Angelopoulos, Konstantinos
dc.creator Philippopoulos, Apostolis
dc.creator Vassilatos, Vanghelis
dc.date 2006
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:55Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:55Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19108
dc.identifier ppn:510010393
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19108
dc.description This paper incorporates an uncoordinated struggle for extra fiscal favors into an otherwise standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model. This reflects the popular belief that interest groups compete for privileged transfers and tax treatment at the expense of the general public interest, and so the aggregate economy stagnates. The model is calibrated to the euro area over the period 1980-2003. Our results show that rent-seeking competition can contribute to explaining the European macroeconomic experience. We also get quantitative evidence of the fraction of collected tax revenues grabbed by rent seekers.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1644
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H23
dc.subject E62
dc.subject E32
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject rent seeking
dc.subject fiscal policy
dc.subject real business cycles
dc.subject Rent Seeking
dc.subject Finanzpolitik
dc.subject Real Business Cycle
dc.subject Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject EU-Staaten
dc.title Rent-seeking competition from State coffers : a calibrated DSGE model of the Euro area
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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