أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Forges, Françoise
dc.creator Koessler, Frédéric
dc.date 2006
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:03:05Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:03:05Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19133
dc.identifier ppn:510020690
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19133
dc.description This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart (2003), we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.
dc.language eng
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1669
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D82
dc.subject C72
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject cheap talk
dc.subject communication
dc.subject diconvexification
dc.subject dimartingale
dc.subject disclosure of certifiable information
dc.subject jointly controlled lotteries
dc.subject Nichtkooperatives Spiel
dc.subject Kommunikation
dc.subject Asymmetrische Information
dc.subject Dynamisches Spiel
dc.subject Nash-Gleichgewicht
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject cheap talk
dc.title Long persuasion games
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط