| dc.creator |
Hefeker, Carsten |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:03:59Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:03:59Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19270 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:47241304X |
|
| dc.identifier |
RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:298 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19270 |
|
| dc.description |
The paper explores the interaction between debt crises and devaluation. Since the optimal level of devaluation in a crisis depends on the level of debt that has to be serviced, a default makes a devaluation less likely. Expected devaluation depends thus on expectations about default which is also a function of the type of policymaker. Therefore, the decision to devalue can be forced upon the government by adverse expectations about default and the type of policymaker in office. I also explore how these uncertainties affect the policymaker?s choice of exchange rate regime. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
HWWA Discussion Paper 298 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
F34 |
|
| dc.subject |
F33 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
debt crisis |
|
| dc.subject |
currency crisis |
|
| dc.subject |
exchange rate regime |
|
| dc.subject |
Finanzmarktkrise |
|
| dc.subject |
Auslandsverschuldung |
|
| dc.subject |
Zahlungsunfähigkeit |
|
| dc.subject |
Wechselkurssystem |
|
| dc.subject |
Public Choice |
|
| dc.subject |
Währungskrise |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|