أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Fecht, Falko
dc.creator Tyrell, Marcel
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:05:21Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:05:21Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19506
dc.identifier ppn:477279619
dc.identifier RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:2917
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19506
dc.description In a framework closely related to Diamond and Rajan (2001) we characterize different financial systems and analyze the welfare implications of different LOLR-policies in these financial systems. We show that in a bank-dominated financial system it is less likely that a LOLR-policy that follows the Bagehot rules is preferable. In financial systems with rather illiquid assets a discretionary individual liquidity assistance might be welfare improving, while in market-based financial systems, with rather liquid assets in the banks' balance sheets, emergency liquidity assistance provided freely to the market at a penalty rate is likely to be efficient. Thus, a "one size fits all"-approach that does not take the differences of financial systems into account is misguiding.
dc.language eng
dc.relation Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2004,39
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D52
dc.subject E44
dc.subject G21
dc.subject E52
dc.subject E58
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Financial Crises
dc.subject Lender of Last Resort
dc.subject Comparing Financial Systems
dc.subject Lender of Last Resort
dc.subject Finanzmarkt
dc.subject Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse
dc.title Optimal lender of last resort policy in different financial systems
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط