المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Discriminatory auctions with seller discretion: evidence from German treasury auctions

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dc.creator Rocholl, Jörg
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:05:25Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:05:25Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19523
dc.identifier ppn:487740661
dc.identifier RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:3374
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19523
dc.description This paper examines the results of 93 discriminatory German Treasury auctions between 1998 and 2002. It documents the seller's use of discretion and its influence on auction outcomes and bidding strategies. The evidence suggests that the seller uses its discretion frequently and substantially. It does not maximize revenues in a single-period game, but moves up in the competitive demand curve to set the auction price close to the market price. Bidders do not make profits in German auctions on average, while their bidding strategies reflect the uncertainty created by the seller's discretion. The paper extends and tests the multi-unit auction model by Lengwiler (1999). The empirical evidence is consistent with the implication that the market-clearing price depends on the seller's marginal cost rather than on the submitted demand.
dc.language eng
dc.relation Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2005,15
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H63
dc.subject G28
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Discriminatory auctions
dc.subject Winner's curse
dc.subject Seller discretion
dc.subject Schatzpapier
dc.subject Öffentliche Anleihe
dc.subject Wertpapieremission
dc.subject Auktionstheorie
dc.subject Wiederholte Spiele
dc.subject Schätzung
dc.subject Deutschland
dc.title Discriminatory auctions with seller discretion: evidence from German treasury auctions
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper
dc.coverage 1998-2002


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