المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Taxing deficits to restrain government spending and foster capital accumulation

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dc.creator Stähler, Nikolai
dc.date 2007
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:06:23Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:06:23Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19703
dc.identifier ppn:546268781
dc.identifier RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:6342
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19703
dc.description In a dynamic model of fiscal policy, social polarization provokes a deficit bias. Policy advisors have recently proposed that governments running a deficit should be forced to generate additional tax revenue. We show that this deficit taxation reduces the deficit bias as it internalizes the externality different lobby groups impose on others. The mechanism described here is not due to the political risk of being elected out of office because the private sector dislikes taxation. Lower government spending and the resulting reduced deficit bias augment capital accumulation.
dc.language eng
dc.relation Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2007,26
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject E62
dc.subject H63
dc.subject H62
dc.subject H61
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject fiscal rules
dc.subject deficit taxation
dc.subject polarization
dc.subject capital accumulation
dc.subject Finanzpolitik
dc.subject Haushaltsdefizit
dc.subject Steuerpolitik
dc.subject Externer Effekt
dc.subject Investition
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject common pool problem
dc.title Taxing deficits to restrain government spending and foster capital accumulation
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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