| dc.creator |
Koetter, Michael |
|
| dc.creator |
Bos, Jaap W. B. |
|
| dc.creator |
Heid, Frank |
|
| dc.creator |
Kool, Clemens J. M. |
|
| dc.creator |
Kolari, James W. |
|
| dc.creator |
Porath, Daniel |
|
| dc.date |
2005 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:06:35Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:06:35Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19742 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:503997730 |
|
| dc.identifier |
RePEc:zbw:bubdp2:4264 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19742 |
|
| dc.description |
The inability of most bank merger studies to control for hidden bailouts may lead to biased results. In this study, we employ a unique data set of approximately 1,000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use data on the regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. We find that, among merging banks, distressed banks had the worst profiles and acquirers perform somewhat better than targets. However, both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than our control group. In fact, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
Discussion Paper, Series 2: Banking and Financial Supervision 2005,09 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
G21 |
|
| dc.subject |
G14 |
|
| dc.subject |
G34 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Mergers |
|
| dc.subject |
bailout |
|
| dc.subject |
X-efficiency |
|
| dc.subject |
multinomial logit |
|
| dc.subject |
Bank |
|
| dc.subject |
Fusion |
|
| dc.subject |
Übernahme |
|
| dc.subject |
Unternehmenssanierung |
|
| dc.subject |
Bankinsolvenz |
|
| dc.subject |
Schätzung |
|
| dc.subject |
Deutschland |
|
| dc.title |
Accounting for distress in bank mergers |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|