أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط
| dc.creator |
Hainz, Christa |
|
| dc.creator |
Boerner, Kira |
|
| dc.date |
2005 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:06:51Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:06:51Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19799 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:500742979 |
|
| dc.identifier |
RePEc:zbw:gdec05:3479 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19799 |
|
| dc.description |
In transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even they have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as a majority of the people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Our model based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead more corruption as more voters are part of the corrupt system. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 6 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
D72 |
|
| dc.subject |
O17 |
|
| dc.subject |
D73 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Corruption |
|
| dc.subject |
Financial Markets |
|
| dc.subject |
Institutions |
|
| dc.subject |
Development |
|
| dc.subject |
Voting |
|
| dc.title |
The Political Economy of Corruption and and the Role of Financial Institutions |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:conferenceObject |
|
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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط