Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy

dc.creator	Hainz, Christa
dc.date	2005
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:06:54Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:06:54Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19811
dc.identifier	ppn:500758492
dc.identifier	RePEc:zbw:gdec05:3491
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19811
dc.description	The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improving institutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 18
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	G33
dc.subject	K10
dc.subject	G21
dc.subject	D82
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	Credit markets
dc.subject	institutions
dc.subject	bank competition
dc.subject	information sharing
dc.subject	bankruptcy
dc.subject	relationship banking
dc.title	Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy
dc.type	doc-type:conferenceObject

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