Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF decisions? Evidence from panel data

dc.creator	Dreher, Axel
dc.creator	Sturm, Jan-Egbert
dc.creator	Vreeland, James Raymond
dc.date	2007
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:07:11Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:07:11Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19860
dc.identifier	ppn:560715803
dc.identifier	RePEc:zbw:gdec07:6527
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19860
dc.description	We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects, and duration dependence. There is also evidence that UNSC membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 4
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	F33
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	IMF
dc.subject	UN Security Council
dc.subject	Voting
dc.subject	Aid
dc.title	Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF decisions? Evidence from panel data
dc.type	doc-type:conferenceObject

الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات	الحجم	الصيغة	عرض
لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.