أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Hefeker, Carsten
dc.date 2007
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:07:15Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:07:15Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19869
dc.identifier ppn:560905467
dc.identifier RePEc:zbw:gdec07:6536
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19869
dc.description The paper explores the interaction between debt crises and devaluation. Since the optimal level of devaluation in a crisis depends on the level of debt that has to be serviced, a default makes a devaluation less likely. Expected devaluation depends thus on expectations about default which is also a function of the type of policymaker. Therefore, the decision to devalue can be forced upon the government by adverse expectations about default and the type of policymaker in office. I also explore how these uncertainties affect the policymaker?s choice of exchange rate regime.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 13
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject F33
dc.subject F34
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject debt crisis
dc.subject currency crisis
dc.subject exchange rate regime
dc.subject Finanzmarktkrise
dc.subject Auslandsverschuldung
dc.subject Zahlungsunfähigkeit
dc.subject Wechselkurssystem
dc.subject Public Choice
dc.subject Währungskrise
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime
dc.type doc-type:conferenceObject


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط