أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Rai, Ashok S.
dc.creator Klonner, Stefan
dc.date 2007
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:07:15Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:07:15Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19874
dc.identifier ppn:560906315
dc.identifier RePEc:zbw:gdec07:6541
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19874
dc.description We investigate how well social collateral does as an alternative to traditional physical collateral. We do so by studying cosigned loans - a borrower´s loan is backed by the personal guarantee of a cosigner. We use a regression discontinuity approach with data from South Indian bidding Roscas. Our main finding is that cosigners do indeed provide social collateral: doubling the number of cosigners halves the probability of arrears for high risk borrowers. We then distinguish between different theories of social collateral. Cosigners may be e¤ective as a monitoring device (a borrower would pay to rid herself of the nuisance of a cosigner) or as an insurance device (a borrower would pay for the benefit of a cosigner). We show that these two interpretations of cosigning have different empirical predictions in the context of a bidding Roscas. We find support for the insurance role of cosigners.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 18
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject G21
dc.subject O16
dc.subject D82
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject credit
dc.subject default
dc.subject cosigner
dc.subject rosca
dc.title Cosigners Help
dc.type doc-type:conferenceObject


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط