أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Fehr, Ernst
dc.creator Tyran, Jean-Robert
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:09:30Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:09:30Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20248
dc.identifier ppn:378770241
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20248
dc.description Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the other players? behavior is key for the equilibrium selection effects of money illusion: even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects are given learning opportunities in the context of an individual optimization problem, powerful and persistent effects of money illusion are found when strategic uncertainty prevails.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1013
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject E32
dc.subject C9
dc.subject E52
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject money illusion
dc.subject coordination failure
dc.subject equilibrium selection
dc.subject multiple equilibria
dc.subject Geldillusion
dc.subject Marktmechanismus
dc.subject Gleichgewicht
dc.subject Pareto-Optimum
dc.subject Spieltheorie
dc.subject Experiment
dc.title Money Illusion and Coordination Failure
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط