أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
dc.creator Holmes, Jessica
dc.creator Matthews, Peter Hans
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:11:19Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:11:19Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20598
dc.identifier ppn:474210936
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20598
dc.description Auctions are a popular way to raise money for charities, but relatively little is known, either theoretically or empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. The small theoretical literature suggests that the all-pay auction should garner more money than winner-pay auctions. We conduct field experiments to test which sealed bid format, first price, second price or all-pay raises the most money. Our experiment suggests that both the all-pay and second price formats are dominated by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the difference between existing theory and the field. To conclude, we show that a model of charity auctions augmented by an endogenous participation decision predicts the revenue ordering that we see in the field.
dc.language eng
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1330
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D64
dc.subject D44
dc.subject C93
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject auction
dc.subject charity
dc.subject participation
dc.subject field experiment
dc.subject Wohltätigkeit
dc.subject Spende
dc.subject Auktionstheorie
dc.subject Experiment
dc.title Charity Auctions : A Field Experimental Investigation
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط