أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
dc.creator Matthews, Peter Hans
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:11:28Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:11:28Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20617
dc.identifier ppn:474411575
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20617
dc.description We define social reciprocity as the act of demonstrating one's disapproval, at some personal cost, for the violation of widely-held norms (e.g., don't free ride). Social reciprocity differs from standard notions of reciprocity because social reciprocators intervene whenever a norm is violated and do not condition intervention on potential future payoffs, revenge, or altruism. Instead, we posit that social reciprocity is a triggered normative response. Our experiment confirms the existence of social reciprocity and demonstrates that more socially efficient outcomes arise when reciprocity can be expressed socially. To provide theoretical foundations for social reciprocity, we show that generalized punishment norms survive in one of the two stable equilibria of an evolutionary game with selection drift.
dc.language eng
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1347
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject Z13
dc.subject C92
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject reciprocity
dc.subject norm
dc.subject experiment
dc.subject public good
dc.subject learning
dc.subject evolution
dc.subject Soziale Beziehungen
dc.subject Soziale Norm
dc.subject Strafe
dc.subject Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
dc.subject Öffentliches Gut
dc.subject Experiment
dc.title Social Reciprocity
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط