أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Danziger, Leif
dc.creator Neuman, Shoshana
dc.date 2003
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:11:28Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:11:28Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20621
dc.identifier ppn:360601510
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20621
dc.description In many countries, an expired labor contract is automatically extended during the often protracted delay before the new contract is signed. Our theoretical model focuses on macroeconomic factors in explaining the delay. It emphasizes the importance of the realized nominal and real shocks, and of the levels of nominal and real uncertainty. The model is tested using Israeli collective wage agreements where long delays are frequent. The empirical findings strongly support the theoretical model. Thus, nominal uncertainty is found to increase the delay, and real uncertainty to decrease the delay, but less in the public than in the private sector.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 709
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J52
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject labor contract
dc.subject renewal
dc.subject delay
dc.subject Befristeter Arbeitsvertrag
dc.subject Lohnverhandlungstheorie
dc.subject Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
dc.subject Schätzung
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject Israel
dc.title Delays in Renewal of Labor Contracts: Theory and Evidence
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper
dc.coverage 1978-1995


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط