| dc.creator |
Fehn, Rainer |
|
| dc.creator |
Meier, Carsten-Patrick |
|
| dc.date |
2001 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T06:20:08Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T06:20:08Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2596 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:751418943 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2596 |
|
| dc.description |
This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on both markets. The more important money is in political decision-making, the more devided the workface is, and the more globalized capital markets are, the more likely is a capitalist politicoeconomic equilibrium with little employment and substantial investor protection. Our prediction of a negative cross-country relationship between labor market rigidities and of competition on capital markets receives considerable empicical support. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
CESifo GmbH München |
|
| dc.relation |
CESifo working paper series 456 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
G34 |
|
| dc.subject |
K22 |
|
| dc.subject |
K42 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
labor markets |
|
| dc.subject |
employment protection |
|
| dc.subject |
corporatism |
|
| dc.subject |
corporate governance |
|
| dc.subject |
shareholder protection |
|
| dc.subject |
political economy |
|
| dc.subject |
Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung |
|
| dc.subject |
Korporatismus |
|
| dc.subject |
Public Choice |
|
| dc.subject |
Arbeitsrecht |
|
| dc.subject |
Aktienrecht |
|
| dc.subject |
Corporate Governance |
|
| dc.subject |
Insider-Outsider-Modell |
|
| dc.subject |
Schätzung |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.subject |
Welt |
|
| dc.title |
The positive economics of labor market rigidities and investor protection |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|