أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Díaz-Vázquez, Pilar
dc.creator Snower, Dennis J.
dc.date 2002
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:01:47Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:01:47Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2822
dc.identifier ppn:354183117
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2822
dc.description Do firms reduce employment when their insiders (established, incumbent employees) claim higher wages? The conventional answer in the theoretical literature is that insider power has no influence on employment, provided that the newly hired employees (entrants) receive their reservation wages. The reason given is that an increase in insider wages gives rise to a countervailing fall in reservation wages, leaving the present value of wage costs unchanged. Our analysis contradicts this conventional answer. We show that, in the context of a stochastic model of the labour market, an increase in insider wages promotes firing in recessions, while leaving hiring in booms unchanged. Thereby insider power reduces average employment.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Centre for Economic Policy Research London
dc.relation CEPR Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research 3472
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject E24
dc.subject J31
dc.subject J32
dc.subject J64
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Lohnstruktur
dc.subject Insider-Outsider-Modell
dc.subject Arbeitsuche
dc.subject Anspruchslohn
dc.subject Marktmacht
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Can insider power affect employment?
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط