أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Foders, Federico
dc.date 1984
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:05:16Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:05:16Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/325
dc.identifier ppn:017808987
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/325
dc.description The issue at stake at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was a new international distribution of ocean wealth along the lines of the so-called New International Economic Order. The best example of interventionism on the international mineral markets is the Convention's regime to govern seabed mining. This paper presents empirical estimates in an attempt to identify net winners and net losers resulting from ocean mining both under the Convention and under open access, and to contrast these outcomes with widely held beliefs concerning the distributional impact of seabed mining. Furthermore, it discusses the desirability and feasibility of loser compensation by the Seabed Authority.
dc.language deu
dc.publisher Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel
dc.relation Kiel Working Papers 206
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.title Who gains from deep-sea mining?
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط